Voracity vs. Scale Effect in a Growing Economy by Mino, Kazuo
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Voracity vs. Scale Effect in a Growing
Economy
Kazuo Mino
Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University
September 2006
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16999/
MPRA Paper No. 16999, posted 29. August 2009 23:41 UTC
Voracity vs. Scale Eﬀect in a Growing Economy
Kazuo Mino∗
Autust 2006
Abstract
This paper extends the standard model of growth with insecure property rights by
introducing variable labor supply and increasing returns to scale. It is assumed that
capital stock is jointly owned by multiple interest groups and that each group participates
production activities by supplying its labor force. In this setting, there are two opposing
factors that aﬀect growth: over consumption in the absence of secure property rights and
the scale eﬀect due to the presence of increasing returns. The growth performance of the
economy thus depends on which factor dominates.
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1 Introduction
The literature on economic growth without secure property rights has often analyzed growth
models in which multiple interest groups exploit commonly accessible resources: see, for
example, Tornell and Velasco (1992), Tornell and Lane (1998 and 1999) and Lindner and
Strulik (2002). A distinguished feature of this kind of modeling is that due to the common
pool problem, a rise in the number of agents participating the exploitation game has a
negative impact on growth. In addition, there may exist the ’voracity eﬀect’: an increase in
productivity would yield a larger consumption growth of each agent than the income growth
generated by the technological improvement, so that a higher productivity decelerates long-
term growth.
The existing studies mentioned above useAk growth models to obtain analytically tractable
solutions of the dynamic games.1 Namely, they assume that final goods are produced by a
commonly owned capital stock alone. In this setting each agent can consume final goods
without participating any production activity. One may conjecture that the main findings in
the growth models with insecure property rights may be generated not only by the common
pool issue but also by such a simple technological specification. To examine this question,
we extend the baseline model by assuming that production needs labor as well as capital
and hence the agents should participate production activities by supplying their labor force.
To keep the tractability of analysis, we still assume that output linearly depends on capital,
which means that the aggregate production technology exhibits increasing returns to scale
with respect to capital and labor. In our generalized setting, there are two opposing fac-
tors that aﬀect growth performance of the economy. The first is the over-consumption eﬀect
generated by the common pool problem and the second is the scale eﬀect produced by the
presence of increasing returns. The first factor may yield the voracity eﬀect, while the second
one contributes to accelerating growth. The resulting growth performance of the economy
with insecure property rights, therefore, depends on which factor dominates in the process of
capital accumulation.
1Lindner and Strulik (2002) also analyze a model with the standard neoclassical technology.
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2 The Model
We use an Ak growth model with variable labor supply. The economy produces a homogenous
final good. The production technology is specified as
y = Akf (L) , A > 0, (1)
where y is output, k is capital and L denotes the aggregate labor supply.2 We assume
that function f (L) is positive, monotonically increasing, strictly concave in L and satisfies
f (0) = 0.The above formulation assumes that the production technology exhibits increasing
return to scale with respect to capital and labor.
There are n (≥ 2) interest groups. The i-th group has si members, so that the total
number of agents in the economy at large is Σni=1si = N. All the agents in the same group
are identical. While the capital stock k is jointly owned by the groups, each member supplies
its own labor for production. Thus, if an individual agent supplies li units of labor, the
aggregate labor supply is L = Σni=1sili. The instantaneous utility of an individual agent
in group i depends positively on consumption, ci, and negatively on labor supply, li. The
objective function of group i is its discounted-sum of utilities over an infinite-time horizon:
Ui =
Z ∞
0
siu (ci, li) e
−ρtdt, ρ > 0, i = 1, 2, ..., n,
where u (.) is assumed to be strictly concave in (ci, li) . The final good is used for consumption
and capital formation. Since we have assumed that the aggregate production technology is
commonly owned by all the groups, the capital formation is determined by
k˙ = Akf (Σni=1sili)−Σni=1sici. (2)
Each group maximizes Ui by selecting the sequences of ci and li subject to (2) together with
the given initial level of capital, k0 (> 0) .
The model given above is a diﬀerential game in which each player’s strategies are its
consumption and labor supply, while the state variable of the game is the aggregate stock of
capital. Following the existing studies, we focus on the Markov-perfect Nash (feedback Nash)
equilibrium. That is, we assume that each group’s strategies, ci and li, are functions of the
2This specification has been used, for instance, by Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Pelloni and Waldmann
(1998).
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current level of the aggregate capital k alone. This means that the value function of the i-th
group’s optimization problem at time t can be written as
Vi (k (t)) ≡ max
Z ∞
t
sie
−ρ(τ−t)u (ci (τ) , li (τ)) dτ .
This function satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation such that
ρVi (k) = max
ci.li
©
siu (ci, li) + V
0
i (k) [Akf (Σ
n
i=1sili)−Σni=1sici]
ª
(3)
for all t ≥ 0. In solving the maximization problem defined in the right-hand-side of (3),
the i-th group takes the other players’ strategies, {cj , lj}j 6=i (j = 1, 2, .., n) , as given. The
first-order conditions for maximization are:
uc (ci, li)− V 0i (k) = 0, i = 1.2., ..., n, (4)
ul (ci, li) + V
0
i (k)Akf
0(L) = 0, i = 1, 2, ..., n. (5)
Equations (4) and (5) give the Markov-perfect Nash solutions, {ci (k) , li (k)} . Substituting
these solutions into the HJB equation (3), we obtain
ρVi (k) = siu (ci (k) , li (k)) + V 0i (k)
£
Akf
¡
Σnj=1sjlj (k)
¢
−Σnj=1sjcj (k)
¤
. (6)
Using the envelop theorem, we find that diﬀerentiation of both sides of (6) with respect to k
yields:
ρV 0i (k) = V 0i (k)
£
Af
¡
Σnj=1sjlj (k)
¢
+Ak
¡
Σnj 6=isjl
0
j (k)
¢
f 0
¡
Σnj=1sjlj (k)
¢
−Σni6=jsjc0j (k)
¤
+V 00i (k)
£
Akf
¡
Σnj=1li (k)
¢
−Σnj=1sicj (k)
¤
, i = 1, 2, ..., n. (7)
3 Strategic Balanced Growth
In what follows, we restrict our attention to the symmetric equilibrium in which it holds that
si = s, ci (k) = c (k) and li (k) = l (k) for all i. We also focus on the balanced-growth equi-
librium where c, k and y grow at a positive, common rate. Since the production technology
has the Ak property, these restrictions require that the optimal consumption of each agent
is proportional to the aggregate capital stock and that the optimal labor supply is constant
over time. Hence, we can set
ci (k) = φk, li (k) = l, i = 1, 2, ..., n, (8)
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where φ and l are unknown, positive constants.
We now specify the instantaneous utility function as
u (ci, li) =
c1−σi
1− σh (li) , 0 < σ < 1, (9)
where h (li) has a positive value and satisfies h0 (li) < 0 and h00 (li) < 0.3 Then, in view of
(8) , condition (4) becomes
V 0 (k) = φ−σk−σh (l) , (10)
implying that
V 00 (k) = −σφ−σk−σ−1h (l) . (11)
Since (8) means that c0i (k) = φ and l0i (k) = 0, by use of (8), (10) and (11) we find that (7)
can be written as
ρ = Af (Nl)− s (n− 1)φ− σ [Af (Nl)−Nφ] ,
which yields
φ = ρ+ (σ − 1)Af (Nl)
N/n+ (σ − 1)N , (12)
whereN = sn.Note that under the symmetric condition, (4) and (5) give φh0 (l) = (σ − 1)Af 0 (Nl) .
Hence, from (12) we obtain
ρ/A+ (σ − 1) f (Nl)
N/n+ (σ − 1)N =
(σ − 1) f 0 (Nl)
h0 (l)
. (13)
This equation determines the equilibrium level of individual labor supply, l, on the balanced-
growth path.4 Letting the steady-state level of l be l∗, from (12) the balanced-growth rate,
which is given by g = k˙/k = Af(Nl∗)−Nc/k = Af (Nl∗)−Nφ, can be expressed as
g =
Af (Nl∗)− nρ
1 + (σ − 1)n . (14)
If we set f (Nl∗) = 1 in (1) and h (l) = 1 in (9) , we obtain the standard modelling that
ignores labor input. In this case the balanced-growth rate is
g =
A− nρ
1 + (σ − 1)n. (15)
This shows that if A < nρ and σ < (n− 1) /n, then the balanced-growth rate is positive and
it is negatively related to the total factor productivity, A. In words, a rise in the total factor
3Our assumptions ensure that u (ci, li) is strictly concave in (ci, li) .
4Equation (13) may have multiple solutions. Here, we restrict our attention to the case where (13) has a
unique solution.
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productivity yields a higher consumption share of income, which depresses the balanced-
growth rate. According to Tornell and Lane (1999), this counter intuitive result may be
called voracity eﬀect in the absence of secure property rights. If the voracity eﬀect is present,
a technological improvement will not contribute to enhancing growth. Additionally, we see
that in the standard modelling without labor an increase in the number of interest groups
reduces the long-term growth rate, because dg/dn = − [ρ+ (1− σ)A] / [1 + (σ − 1)n]2 < 0.
In our generalized setting, (14) shows that the eﬀect of a change in productivity on growth
is:
dg
dA
=
1
1 + (σ − 1)n
∙
f (Nl∗) +Af 0N
dl∗
dA
¸
, (16)
where from (13) dl∗/dA is given by
dl∗
dA
=
ρh02
A2 (σ − 1) [h02f 0N − s (1 + (σ − 1)n) (Nf 00h0 − f 0h00)] .
In the above, if σ < (n− 1) /n (i.e.1 + (σ − 1)n < 0), then dl∗/dA < 0. As a result, if a
rise in A yields a suﬃcient reduction of individual labor supply, (16) shows that dg/dA has
a positive value even under σ < (n− 1) /n. This means that introducing endogenous labor
supply and increasing returns to scale reduces the possibility that the voracity eﬀect prevails.
We may also confirm that the sign of dg/dn cannot be uniquely determined without imposing
further specification on the functional forms and the magnitudes of parameters involved in
the model.5
4 The Case of Separable Utility
Now assume that the utility is additively separable one:
u (ci, li) = log ci + Λ (li) , Λ0 < 0, Λ00 < 0,
In this case, conditions (10) and (11) respectively become V 0 (k) = 1/φk and V 00 (k) =
−1/φk2. Thus (7) shows that φ = ρ/s. The first-order conditions (4) and (5) yield
−ρΛ0 (l) = Af 0 (Nl) . (17)
5 It should be noted that if n increases under a given s, the total number of agents N (= sn) rises as well.
If N stays constant, a rise in n reduces s (= N/n) . In both cases, the sign of dg/dn is ambiguous. See Section
4 for a further discussion on this point.
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This equation determines the steady-state level of individual labor supply for the case of
additively separable utility. Since φ = ρ/s, the balanced-growth rate is given by
g = Af (Nl∗)−Nφk = Af (Nl∗)− nρ. (18)
First, consider the eﬀect of a rise in A. Using (17) and (18) , we find:
dg
dA
= f (Nl∗)− AN (f
0)2
Af 00N + ρΛ00 > 0.
Thus if the agents utility functions are additively separable between consumption and labor,
there is no voracity eﬀect. Next, consider a change in the number of interest groups. If the
total population, N (= sn), is constant, a rise in n (so a decrease in the number of agents
in each group, s) unambiguously lowers the balanced growth rate, because form (17) the
steady-state level of l does not depend on n under a given N. In contrast, if the number
of groups stays constant but the number of members of each group increases (so the total
population N rises), we obtain
dg
ds
¯¯¯¯
n=constant
=
ρnl∗Af 0Λ00
ANf 00 + ρΛ00 > 0.
Thus if the number of players is constant, a rise in population stimulates growth because
there is only scale eﬀect. However, if the population rises due to an increase in the number
of groups, we obtain:
dg
dn
¯¯¯¯
s=constant
=
ρsl∗Af 0Λ00
ANf 00 + ρΛ00 − ρ.
The sign of this is ambiguous.
To specify the sign of dg/dn|s=constant , let us assume that f (L) = Lβ and Λ (l) =
−l1+χ/ (1 + χ) , where 0 < β < 1 and χ > 0. Then from (17) the steady-state level of l
is given by
l∗ =
µ
Aβ
ρ
¶ 1
χ+1−β
N
β−1
χ+1−β .
Hence, the balanced growth rate determined by (18) is
g = A
χ+1
χ+1−β
µ
β
ρ
¶ β
χ+1−β
(sn)
βχ
χ+1−β − ρn.
Since the right-hand side of the above is strictly concave in n, the the growth eﬀect of a
change in the number of agents is:
dg
dn
¯¯¯¯
s=constant
> 0 for n < nˆ,
dg
dn
¯¯¯¯
s=constant
< 0 for n > nˆ,
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where nˆ satisfies µ
βχ
χ+ 1− β
¶
A
χ+1
χ+1−β
µ
β
ρ
¶
s
βχ
χ+1−β nˆ
(β−1)(χ+1)
1+χ−β = ρ.
Namely, when the number of interest groups is smaller than nˆ, the scale eﬀect due to the
presence of increasing returns dominates the negative eﬀect of common pool problem caused
by an increase in the number of players. However, if n exceeds nˆ, the scale eﬀect is not
large enough to cancel the common pool eﬀect and thus a lager number of interest groups
depresses the long-term growth. This example demonstrates that, unlike the representative-
agent economy with increasing returns, a rise in the scale of economy may have a negative
impact on growth if property rights are insecure.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have extended the standard model of growth with insecure property rights
by introducing variable labor supply and increasing returns to scale. We have assumed that
capital stock is jointly owned by multiple interest groups and that each group participates
production activities by supplying its labor force. Given these assumptions, there are two
opposing factors that aﬀect growth: over consumption in the absence of secure property
rights and the scale eﬀect due to the presence of increasing returns. We have revealed that
the growth performance of the economy thus depends on which factor dominates.
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